The Main Drivers and Aims of the Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty does not necessarily entail alignment and a desire to confront the US. Rather, its main goal is to utilise largely unused capacities in relations on the one hand and to try to define ordering mechanisms in the region on the other in order to provide for stability, interests, and more sustainable relations, writes Alireza Noori, Assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.  

Many analysts believe that the Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty (CSPT) is mainly driven by shared opposition to the US and interpret it as a means of taking sides against the US/the West. Without a doubt, one can agree that aggressive US pressure on Tehran and Moscow, as a “coercive factor”, has had a great impact on their pursuit of the CSPT. But the US is not the only driver of the treaty. There is another important driver which is considered less in analyses as a “selective factor”. This is changes in the international system, especially a transition to new regional and international orders, and Tehran and Moscow’s efforts at active and innovative adaptation to this development.

Regarding the first driver – systemic pressure from the US – it should be noted that in recent years Washington has adopted a strategy of aggressive containment, which it applies against revisionist forces, including Iran and Russia. This pressure has been applied in various issues and areas, and its goal is to consolidate US supremacy in international politics and to turn Iran and Russia into subordinate actors who accept US considerations without challenge. The views in Iran and Russia are similar in this regard; they consider the main reason for US pressure to be their insistence on strategic independence. The experiences of the two countries show that, despite their willingness at times to compromise with the US, Washington insists on achieving its goal through a policy of aggressive containment.

For example, although Iran tried to improve its relations with the US/the West by signing the JCPOA, the response was a US withdrawal from the deal, a strategy of maximum pressure against it during the first Trump term and smart pressure against it during the Biden presidency. This situation has led Iranian officials to conclude that there is no hope for improving relations with the US. This conclusion and the very high possibility of pressure being escalated against Iran by the new Trump administration are an important impetus for Tehran to sign the CSPT with Russia.

On the other hand, although Russia has at times (including during the ‘Reset’ project) advocated compromise and interaction with the US, it has found itself facing an America that does not allow any space for Moscow to act independently. Russia’s cooperative approach not only failed to meet any positive response from the US, but saw a continuation of various threatening and coercive actions in the form of an aggressive containment strategy. The continuity of these actions is evident from intervention in the CIS region of waves of NATO expansion to the East and especially the proxy war in Ukraine. Understanding the common nature and meaningful continuum of the components of Washington’s coercive policy against Iran and Russia is an important factor in pushing the two countries to sign the CSPT.

Regarding the second driver, both Tehran and Moscow agree that the international and regional orders are in transition. During this transformation, Western/US control and dominance over international affairs is weakening, and consequently, the ordering mechanisms (including balances, institutions, regimes, etc.) are either ineffective, weakened, or disappearing. This situation is accompanied by threats and opportunities. The threat is that the transitional situation will create uncertainty, instability, and tension in various areas, and the opportunity is that actors who, for whatever reason, have been under systemic pressure will have the chance to strengthen their position in the international system by participating more actively in defining ordering mechanisms of the future order(s).

Iran and Russia, knowing these changes to be certain, consider themselves at an important juncture of redefining equations and redistributing power in the international and regional arenas. They are determined to turn threats into opportunities and increase their share of future arrangements through innovative actions. One of the requirements for achieving this goal is synergy for greater effectiveness and even defining ordering mechanisms. Signing the CSPT by determining a framework for sustainable synergy can contribute to the interests of Iran and Russia as two like-minded countries that both play a major role in Central Asia, the Caspian Sea region, the South Caucasus, the Levant, and the Middle East.

Although, as in the past, bilateral and regional interactions between the two countries can continue without a new long-term agreement, they are determined to institutionalise long-term relations via the CSPT in order to increase the predictability of relations, reduce ambivalence, decrease the impact of external variables, and stabilize ties. In summary, Tehran and Moscow are pursuing the following important goals by singing the CSPT:

1.      Objective approach to mutual capacities and stabilising relations. Despite the existence of many interests and capacities in Iran-Russia relations, their interaction in the post-Soviet period has never reached the appropriate level; existing capacities have not been optimally used, and their ties lack stability. A range of different bilateral, regional, and international reasons are involved in why this is the case. International factors have been important, especially the impact of “the US variable”. This variable has had a negative effect on relations in most cases. For example, whenever Iran or Russia’s relations with the US have improved or were on the path to improvement, relations between Moscow and Tehran have been limited. This reality can be seen in Russia’s distancing from Iran during Medvedev’s presidency. Recognising these disadvantages, Tehran and Moscow have decided to pay more attention to bilateral relations and make more use of the capacities of relations by signing the CSPT. With this in mind, the CSPT is in fact an attempt to reduce the negative impact of “the US variable” on Iran-Russia relations. Signing the CSPT just a few days before Trump’s inauguration sends the message that possible changes during his era will not affect Iran-Russia relations.

2.      Countering the United States’ aggressive containment strategy. Given that Iran and Russia are under similar systemic pressure from the US in various political, economic, security, military, social, media, etc. areas, sustainable and long-term cooperation in these fields, which is emphasised in the text of the CSPT, can strengthen the two countries’ “active defence strategy” against the US. They can benefit from each other’s capacities in different fields and increase their bargaining power against the US. The manifestation of this issue can be seen in Moscow’s political support for Iran’s positions in nuclear negotiations or in Iran’s drone cooperation with Russia in the proxy war in Ukraine.

3.      Strengthening the active deterrence strategy. Considering the ongoing tensions between Iran and Russia with the US, as well as direct and indirect military threats against Tehran or proxy war against Moscow, the two countries have “active deterrence” as an important principle in their defence doctrine. Although Iran has developed its military capabilities in recent years, including with respect to missiles and drones, it needs weapons and military technology to modernize its military capability. Meanwhile, Russia is the most important option for supplying weapons. On the other, although Russia is one of the world’s leading military powers, some new technologies, including Iranian drones, could be attractive to it. Exchanging these capabilities in the framework of the CSPT could be beneficial for both sides and help their active deterrence strategy.

4.      De-Americanisation/de-Westernisation of regional issues. Iran and Russia have direct interests and connections in the regions of Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus, and have also had historical cooperation and interaction in the Middle East. They agree on this point: that US/Western interference in these regions has been destructive, and the ruinous consequences are evident in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, among other places. Tehran and Moscow have come to believe that closer interaction can, while reducing the opportunities for the US/West to interfere in regional affairs, provide a better basis for implementing the principle of “managing regional issues with the participation of regional countries.” Closer interaction can take a sustainable form in the framework defined by the CSPT. Tehran and Moscow, by signing the CSPT, show that US/Western interference in the region, which has been carried out without consideration for their interests, is no longer acceptable. The two countries are seeking to define an order and ordering mechanisms that will bring the region more sustainable interactions, relations, stability, and security “without the US”.

5.      Economisation of foreign policy. Imbalance is one of the major problems of Iran-Russia relations. This means that although the two countries have many interactions in the political and military spheres, their economic relations are very small. According to statistics, Iran-Russia trade in the first 9 months of 2023 was only $1.9 billion, which shows that a lot of potential has not been used. This is while the two countries are under US/Western sanctions and, rationally, they can reduce these pressures by strengthening economic relations. It seems that understanding this problem has led to the economic sphere occupying a special place in the provisions of the CSPT. This treaty can provide a better framework for Iran’s cooperation with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union and, in turn, facilitate Russia’s economic interaction with the South, including through the North-South Corridor.

6.      Developing regional influence. Iran is an important regional power in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, whose influence and activism in the political, economic, and security orders of these regions cannot be easily ignored by major powers, even the US. With this in mind, by developing cooperation with Iran, Russia can benefit from Tehran’s capacities to expand its influence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Russia is an influential power in Greater Eurasia, so close relations with it will certainly be effective in developing Tehran’s interests in this supercontinent. In this regard, the CSPT in addition to strengthening bilateral relations, can also be a platform for developing the parties’ regional interests in the Middle East and Greater Eurasia.

7.      Contributing to regional stability. Both Iran and Russia hope to maintain regional stability and security, and both countries share concerns about potential threats emerging, from Afghanistan to Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East, and on issues such as NATO expansion and terrorism. This concern has increased with the escalation of tensions in the Middle East and Ukraine, which Tehran and Moscow believe have arisen due to direct and indirect US/Western interference. Although the two countries have lacked a stable model for cooperation to provide stability and security, the understanding of a meaningful relationship, between the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, which are linked by the destabilizing expansionism of the US, has led to closer interaction between them. The CSPT could better organize cooperation in this regard and provide a framework not only for confronting symmetric instabilities, but also asymmetric threats, including manipulated terrorism.

As is clear, these aims are long-term in nature and can be achieved through long-term cooperation. There are two problems with this goal. First, there is a long way from agreement to implementation, and in addition to signing documents, practical will is essential to making the CSPT a reality. Delays and hesitations on either side, including Iran’s delay in completing the North-South Corridor and Russia’s delay in providing new military weapons to Iran, indicate that practical will is not yet strong.

The second point is that, naturally, effective long-term cooperation between Iran and Russia will face a negative reaction from the US, which, considering this a threat, will try to disrupt these relations. Washington seeks to contain and limit Iran and Russia, so any effective long-term interaction between the two countries sends the message that the policy of pressure has not been successful.

Of course, the CSPT does not necessarily mean alignment and a desire to confront the US. Rather, as mentioned, its main goal is to use the largely unused capacities in relations on the one hand and to try to define ordering mechanisms in the region on the other to provide for stability, shared interests, and more sustainable relations. From this perspective, since the US has an “inherent need” for “enemy-building projects”, the false propaganda that the main goal of the CSPT is to oppose the US can be a suitable excuse to destroy the treaty and long-term relations between Tehran and Moscow.

Author:  Alireza Noori

Source: Valdai Club

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