استادیار دانشکده اقتصاد و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه شهید بهشتی
استادیار دانشکده اقتصاد و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه شهید بهشتی
Incentives and Impediments to Iran-Russia Military Cooperation
Introduction
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu recently paid a visit to Iran, which was the first of its kind in the past 15 years, during which he and his Iranian counterpart signed an agreement to stress their countries’ determination to boost high-level security and military cooperation both at bilateral and regional levels.
Of course, they agreed that the details of the
agreement should be hashed out during a possible visit to Iran by the
Russian President Vladimir Putin. This development can, therefore be a
prelude to expansion of military cooperation between the two countries.
Naturally, like all other military agreements, most parts of Iran-Russia
agreement will be confidential and, therefore, various aspects of that
agreement as well as its practical outcomes cannot be freely discussed
now.
However, there is almost no doubt that
the implementation of this agreement will “relatively” change regional
equations. In the meantime, special emphasis has been put on the
delivery of Russia’s S-300 missile system to Iran. However, beyond that
issue, the visit by Russian defense minister and signing of the
agreement should be viewed within a vaster framework in which
large-scale viewpoints of Iran and Russia about the necessity of
bolstering security and military cooperation to meet common interests
and counteract common threats to both countries will be of more
significance. Undoubtedly, there are many factors that may cast doubt on
the implementation of this agreement. However, there are also
incentives and necessities that can prompt Tehran and Moscow to boost
their cooperation in the field of military technology.
Incentives
Differences with the West:
On top of the list of incentives for the expansion of military
relations between Iran and Russia one should point to both countries’
continued differences with the Western countries, which do not seem to
be overcome in the short term. This issue, in addition to the
possibility of the US Republicans sweeping to a presidential vote win in
forthcoming elections, has prompted officials in Tehran and Moscow to
try to bolster their positions and find new partners and tools in order
to boost their bargaining power in the face of the West. In the
meantime, although Iran and Russia do not have strategic relations, and
the prospect for the establishment of such relations in medium term is
dim, due to hostile approach of the West to both countries, they have
been, and still are, trying to make the most of their various capacities
to reduce the burden of the West’s pressures.
During
the past year, the West has been insisting on its geopolitical
advancement toward the east within its anti-missile defense scheme. In
the meantime, NATO has been trying to expand its realm at a time that
Western countries have been pursuing controlled chaos strategy in the
Middle East and indirect action strategy in Ukraine. In the meantime,
officials in Tehran and Moscow have not remained idle and have been
taking steps to further strengthen their military stamina in parallel to
bolstering military cooperation as an effective tactic to counteract
the West’s pressure. Following the developments in Libya, Syria and then
Ukraine, Russia came to realize the depth of its differences with the
West and the threat that was posed to it by becoming dependent on the
West in all aspects of its relations.
Therefore,
Moscow decided to make a U-turn by mending fences with countries in its
east and south, including Iran. On the other hand, due to increasing
pressures by the US Republicans to escalate sanctions against Iran, a
move which Iranian diplomats have described as the end of diplomacy with
the West, Tehran has been considering all available scenarios, even
military confrontation with the West. Naturally, receiving advanced
defense systems from Russia will make it difficult for Iran's
adversaries to think about a military option on the country.
Fighting common regional threats:
Maintaining regional stability and security is a common benefit for
Iran and Russia. Therefore, both countries have been especially
concerned about any jeopardy to regional stability and security from
Afghanistan to Central Asia, Caspian basin, South Caucasus, and the
Middle East, especially Iraq and Syria. Tehran and Moscow have been also
feeling concerned about the US plan to expand its anti-missile defense
umbrella, eastward expansion of the NATO, and the spreading threat of
terrorism. Although increased military cooperation between Iran and
Russia will not be possibly adequate to address all these threats, it
can be effective in reducing threats.
In this
regard, good understanding on the part of Iran about the ongoing
developments in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and the activities of the
Islamic State terrorist group, on the one hand, combined with Russia’s
intelligence and military capabilities, on the other hand, can serve to
effectively rein in such escalating threats. Both countries have already
had irregular military cooperation, but the recent military agreement
can provide a good ground for more regular military collaboration
between Tehran and Moscow.
Bolstering political
and geopolitical influence: It cannot be denied that Russia is worried
about possible achievement of a comprehensive nuclear agreement by Iran
and the West, as a consequence of which Moscow will lose a lot of the
political influence and geopolitical advantages arising from Iran's
hostility with the West. This issue, has been certainly one of the
reasons behind recent steps taken by Russia to bolster military
cooperation with Iran in order to fend off possible future losses. This
is true as one of the major advantages of military agreements is
increased political and geopolitical influence that follows conclusion
of such agreements. Therefore, some Russia experts believe that
geopolitical aspects of Mr. Shoigu’s Tehran visit are much more
important than its technical aspects.
They
have emphasized that due to aggressive geopolitical approach that the
West has taken to Russia, strengthening Russia’s relations with
countries that share ideas with Moscow will be instrumental in
preventing further advances by the West. On the other hand, one of the
points covered by the new agreement has been facilitation of berthing
for military vessels of the two countries in each other’s ports.
Therefore, Russia hopes that by receiving permits from Iran, it would be
able to revive its presence in the Persian Gulf, which had been
effectively ended since 1946. This issue will certainly play an
important part in increasing international prestige of Russia.
Economic benefits: Increased
sale of weapons for the strengthening of Russian military industries
and earning more money at a time that global oil prices are at
historical lows, should be considered as one of the most important goals
of the recent military agreement signed between Tehran and Moscow.
Russia has already signed similar contracts with Egypt, India and a
number of Latin American countries. Russian media have been putting
emphasis on Iran's need to renovate its military industries, stipulating
that Russia should take the best advantage of this opportunity and
export even modern jet fighters to Iran, thus, consolidating its control
over the Iranian weapons market.
The visit by
Mr. Shoigu to India after his trip to Iran and the efforts he made to
pave the way for selling more armaments to New Delhi put the rubberstamp
on the fact that economic reasons underlie Russia’s military agreements
with other countries. However, since Iran has already mastered certain
areas of military technology and is capable of building missiles similar
to S-300 system, the country is now looking for more modern weaponry.
As a result, Tehran has proposed to join hands with Russia to produce
modern weapons and pave the way for the transfer of Russia’s advanced
military technology to Iran. In doing so, Iran is clearly indicating
that it has no plan to turn into a mere customer of Russian weapons.
Impediments
Avoiding further worsening of relations with the West:
Both Iran and Russia are at a sensitive juncture of their relations
with the West. Tehran is moving toward improvement of relations with the
West, while Moscow is heading for more tension. The future outlook for
both countries, however, is ambiguous. Under these conditions, both
countries are avoiding any measure that may escalate tensions with the
West. This is why the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has noted
that Russia is now willing and will not allow another Cold War to begin.
Moscow is well aware of institutionalized
differences between Iran and the West while Tehran, on the other hand,
is well informed about the ongoing tensions between Russia and the West.
Both countries also know that any form of practical development of
their relations will provide the West with more excuses to mount
pressures on Tehran and Moscow. This is why both countries have been
cautious about further development of their relations, especially when
it comes to military matters.
Of course,
although both Tehran and Moscow avoid further tension with the West and
do not want to give excuses to the Western countries, this does not mean
that they will coordinate all their measures with the West. On the
opposite, both countries are taking their own pragmatic approach to this
issue and believe that a multi-vectoral policy is more suitable at this
juncture. They are also aware that the more they retreat in the face of
the West, the Western countries will be emboldened to make new
advances.
Lack of mutual trust: Moscow
is well aware that the “need” for having an ally in the face of the
West has inclined Iran toward Russia. Therefore, if Iran's differences
with the West are resolved, including through possible signing of a
comprehensive nuclear agreement, interactions with Russia would be of
less importance to the Islamic Republic. On the opposite, Iran is also
aware that Moscow has become willing to work with Iran due to mere
“coercion” resulting from the challenges that it has in its relations
with the West.
Therefore, it is quite possible
that when that “coercion” no more exists, Russia would not have any
more reasons to expand its relations with Iran, especially in the
sensitive field of military technology. Iran has also relevant
experiences in this regard. Russia has always pursued its ties with Iran
as a function of its relations with the West. Therefore, as evidenced
by the abrogation of the contract for delivery of S-300 missile systems
to Iran, the West will be a major factor determining whether Moscow will
abide by its commitments to Iran.
Iran is also
well informed about the common interests that Russia and the West have
in the field of international security and knows that Moscow prefers to
work with the West in this regard. Tehran also remembers the proposal
offered by Mr. Putin to the United States for common use of Gabala Radar
Station in the Republic of Azerbaijan when the United States was trying
to expand its anti-missile shield against Iran.
Therefore,
Tehran has no doubt that Russia will never prefer cooperation with Iran
to long-term security and military cooperation with the West. In
addition, Tehran knows that it should avoid overdependence on Russia in
military fields, which will be also followed by increased political
clout of Russia over Iran. This is why Tehran does not seem to have an
extended view to expansion of military relations with Russia and is just
trying to meet its own defense needs by taking advantage of military
and intelligence capacities of Russia in order to deal with regional
threats in a better way.
Israel: Although
Israel is not the main partner of Moscow in the Middle East, officials
in Kremlin have time and again emphasized importance of their country’s
ties with Tel Aviv. Without a doubt, Tel Aviv’s lobby was one of the
main reasons why Russia repealed its contract with Iran for the delivery
of S-300 missile system and can also explain why Moscow changed its
mind about equipping Tehran with advanced weaponry. Therefore, Israel’s
opposition to further development of military relations between Tehran
and Moscow should be also taken into account as a factor with relative
influence.
Conclusion
As
the existing trends show, the number of agreement that have been signed
between Iran and Russia, but their implementation has been hampered due
to a host of bilateral, regional and international reasons is not
small. The contract for the construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant,
the contract for the delivery of S-300 missile system, and a recent
memorandum of understanding to swap oil for goods are but a few examples
to the point. Military cooperation between Iran and Russia has a long
and bumpy road to go. Under present circumstances, both countries are
more willing for cooperation. Of course, if Mr. Putin put the last
confirming seal on the recent agreement in his forthcoming visit to
Tehran, then the issue of its implementation and its possible outcomes
could be discussed more seriously.
The
important point with regard to the implementing of this military
agreement and possible delivery of S-300 missiles or their lookalikes to
Iran is that Moscow should first repeal an executive order issued on
September 22, 2010, by the then Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev,
which effectively banned export of “certain” military equipment to Iran
in relation to international sanctions imposed on Tehran by the United
Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1929. Abrogation of that order
will, on the one hand, be admittance of a mistake by Russia, while on
the other hand, it would point to the possibility of the cancellation of
other restrictions that Moscow has considered in its ties with Tehran
in relation to the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, including Iran's
possible membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
By: Alireza Noori
Source: iranreview.org / January 30, 2015